DN 9 Ven. Sabbamitta (and Ajahn Brahm) uses faulty reasoning in claiming first jhāna is disembodied formless attainment
Ven. Sabbamitta (and Ajahn Brahm) uses faulty reasoning in claiming first jhāna is disembodied (5 senses are shut off)
She wrote:
...
I find the description in DN 9 particularly clear in this respect because this focuses on the perceptions in each of these stages. And it makes it very clear that with the first Jhana, physical sensations ara abandoned:
DN9:10.1-3: Quite secluded from sensual pleasures, secluded from unskillful qualities, they enter and remain in the first absorption, which has the rapture and bliss born of seclusion, while placing the mind and keeping it connected.
The sensual perception that they had previously ceases.
At that time they have a subtle and true perception of the rapture and bliss born of seclusion.
Frankk response:
I've already done detailed research showing why kāmehi is referring to sensuality-desire, not the objects of desire, here:Comprehensive gloss of vivicc’eva kāmehi from STED 1st Jhāna
a.blogspot.com/2020/03/comprehensive-gloss-of-vivicceva-kamehi.html
In short, the Buddha already stated explicitly in AN 6.63, it's the desire that kāmehi refers to, not objects of desire.
Abhidhamma Vibhanga book on jhāna, glossing first jhāna term 'kāmehi', confirms what the Buddha already authoritatively stated in the suttas.
And many more passages from various suttas.
And I just found one more today.
Notice the title of the sutta (the second sutta, following the first sutta AN 6.73 on giving details on first jhāna).
So when the sutta title explicitly says it's talking about first jhāna, and then explains terms from the first jhāna formula, it's talking about first jhāna's kāma, kāmehi, vitakka, and not those terms in a non-jhāna context.
In the sutta below, notice where I highlighted kāma-sañña and kāma-vitakka, the terms Ven. Sabbamitta was erroneously claiming refer to "objects" rather than sensual-desire.
Since it corresponds to sammā-saṇkappo, right resolve, the kāma is sensual-desire in opposition to renunciation perceptions + thoughts, not "objects of sensual desire".
Just as the other components of right resolve, are talking about ill will and harming, not "objects for which we have ill will" and "objects we want to harm".
non-ill will is the opposite of ill-will.
the opposite of passion, craving, sensual-desire is renunciation (nekkhamma).
The opposite of "object" is "not an object", rather than renunciation (nekkhamma).
AN 6.74 Dutiyata-j-jhāna-: First jhāna (2nd)
74. Dutiyata-j-jhāna-sutta | 74. First jhāna (2nd) |
“Cha, bhikkhave, dhamme appahāya abhabbo paṭhamaṃ jhānaṃ upasampajja viharituṃ. | “monks, without giving up these six [bad]-dharmas you can’t enter and remain in the first jhāna. |
Katame cha? | What six? |
Kāma-vitakkaṃ, | 1. sensual-pleasure-thought, |
byāpāda-vitakkaṃ, | 2. ill-will-thought, |
vihiṃsā-vitakkaṃ, | 3. harming-thought, |
kāma-saññaṃ, | 4. sensual-pleasure-perception, |
byāpāda-saññaṃ, | 5. ill-will-perception, |
vihiṃsā-saññaṃ— | 6. harming-perception, |
ime kho, bhikkhave, cha dhamme appahāya abhabbo paṭhamaṃ jhānaṃ upasampajja viharituṃ. | Without giving up these six [bad]-dharmas you can’t enter and remain in the first jhāna. |
Cha, bhikkhave, dhamme pahāya bhabbo paṭhamaṃ jhānaṃ upasampajja viharituṃ. | But after giving up these six [bad]-dharmas you can enter and remain in the first jhāna. |
Katame cha? | What six? |
Kāma-vitakkaṃ, | 1. sensual-pleasure-thought, |
byāpāda-vitakkaṃ, | 2. ill-will-thought, |
vihiṃsā-vitakkaṃ, | 3. harming-thought, |
kāma-saññaṃ, | 4. sensual-pleasure-perception, |
byāpāda-saññaṃ, | 5. ill-will-perception, |
vihiṃsā-saññaṃ— | 6. harming-perception, |
ime kho, bhikkhave, cha dhamme pahāya bhabbo paṭhamaṃ jhānaṃ upasampajja viharitun”ti. | After giving up these six [bad]-dharmas you can enter and remain in the first jhāna.” |
(end of sutta⏹️)
Conclusion
The number of logical fallacies and faulty reasoning that Ven. Sabbamitta uses are staggering.
They are the same bag of tricks used by Ajahn Brahm, his ordained disciples and his followers: cherry picking, pāḷi grammar sophistry and general sophistry, confirmation bias, ostriching (sticking your head in the sand and ignoring all the suttas like MN 111, MN 125, AN 9.36, AN 9.37, and more which show the four jhānas are clearly embodied states with all 6 sense faculties active).
1. If you disagree with the Buddha's gloss of kāmehi (AN 6.63), and the Abhidamma Vb confirmation of that gloss, you have to come up with a very compelling reason why the Buddha is wrong and you're right, and why the Abhidhamma is wrong in agreeing with the Buddha.
2. If a grammatical case matches several categories, instrumental, locative, singular vs. plural, or whatever, you can't just pick the one that matches your agenda and claim that's the right one. You have to show why it's that one, and not the other potential matches.
3. Even if for the sake of argument, we assume kāmehi was referring to "objects" and not sensual-desire for objects in the first jhāna formula, being secluded from those objects does not mean you have to be in a disembodied formless attainment.
For example, Ven. Sabbamitta can go into an empty cave, lock the door, and she would be 'secluded from objects'. She can still walk, talk, think. All 5 sense faculties working.
4. There are other problems with her reasoning in DN 9, but I'll leave it at the first 3, since those are the most glaring problems.
Ajahn Brahm was born in London in 1951 and earned a degree in theoretical physics from Cambridge University.
Cambridge university, famous for nobel laureates in Physics, etc., is that how they teach reasoning and critical thinking skills there?
Related
Even if you want to take kāma as 'objects', instead of 'desire', first jhāna still has to answer to the four noble truths:Ajahn Brahm declares* that the Buddha was wrong about the second noble truth: the cause of suffering is not 'craving'
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