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In EA 12.1, B. Analayo's "directed awareness and sustained contemplation" sustains fatal blow to common sense and logic

In EA 12.1 (one of the satipatthana agama parallels), B. Analayo's "directed awareness and sustained contemplation" sustains fatal blow to common sense and logic

A forum member on reddit had a thoughtful response to a recent blog article of mine: (My response to his comments follow his msg.) 

post replyMA 101 and MA 102, the agama parallels for MN 19 and MN 20 are prime examples of B. Analayo's erroneous translation of vitakka

from animuseternal via /r/Buddhism sent 

'Erroneous' is quite the claim.

jué

I'm not sure what exactly you're saying is the meaning of this term, but 'discursive thought' is a fair translation.

treated the vitakka and vicara for first jhana as being different in some way from ordinary vitakka and vicara as discursive thinking, and so they chose the different Chinese words jue and guan to reflect the difference from the ordinary vitakka 'nian' 念 that they usually use outside first jhana.

That doesn't mean 'discursive thought' can't be used in multiple contexts in English. We don't have as many terms for "thought" or "mind" or other such things as other languages. There are at least three, probably more, different terms we translate into the single English term "mind". This doesn't make it inaccurate or erroneous translation; it just means that the translation is never going to be precise without elaboration.

More than that, these terms in Chinese mean a lot of different things. 'Nian' means a lot of different things in different contexts, as does 'jue' and 'guan.' Each have their own set of associations in their native language, and a rough range of associated ideas. 'Nian' and 'guan' can both have connotations of 'visualized thought', for instance, while 'nian' also holds a connotation for memory, and 'jue' has a connotation for understanding (i.e. for discursive cognizing of a concept or idea).

In general, we can see it as a continuum--'nian' is a translation of 'smrti', so we generally should just keep that in mind with regard to its meaning and usage. You're calling it 'ordinary thought', and you're right insofar as it's effectively a term that doesn't really have any meditative associations, and as a dharma practice, nian can be practiced by anyone, on a multitude of objects. It is best translated as 'mindfulness', imo, and does not quite have the same connotations of thought.

I honestly don't know how you are conceiving 'jue', but I don't think I can call it anything other than 'discursive thought' or maybe like.. 'reasoning'. In general, I'd say the conception of this word to refer to verbalized thinking in general is pretty fair. 'Directed awareness' is much closer to the Path of Purification (I can never remember how to spell this in Pali) interpretation, but it's also a fair translation. The point in general is that this act of cognition is performed with the logical mind.

'Vicara' as 'sustained contemplation' also comes from the Buddhagosha interpretation, but it is also a fair translation of 'guan,' such as in the Contemplation of Amitabha Sutra, in Vietnamese called the Kinh Quán Vô Lượng Thọ (Sutra of the Contemplation/Visualization of Amitayus), which is obviously a meditative text that instructs a long and sustained contemplation, with far more detail than 'nian' infers, and none of the logical processing of thoughts inferred by 'jue.'

In general, I agree that English alone is never going to tell the full story, and it's good to compare terms across languages, but the claim that Analayo's translation is 'wrong' here is taking it a bit far. It's more that English is just kind of a cruddy language for this, which is precisely the reason why so many of us here, and so many Buddhist scholars, write in 'Buddhist Hybrid English' when we want precision in terminology conveyed over English readability.

Frankk's response:

I agree with most of what you're saying. However:

While "contemplation" for vicara/guan, is fine on its own, a perfectly legitimate translation and interpretation, it breaks down the coherence of the dharma when he's using the same translation for other terms, i.e. anu-passana of satipatthana practice also as "contemplation".

In EA 12.1  for example, one of the agama counterparts to MN 10 satipatthana sutta,

(In my translation, derived from B. Analayo's, I substitute his V&V first jhana translations with my own) 

EA 12.1 explicitly shows the 4 jhanas operating concurrently with the 4th satipatthana Dharma anupassana. So when vicara "contemplation" is eliminated when one transitions to 2nd jhana, that would mean one can't do 'contemplation' anymore (anu passana of satipatthana), a logical absurdity.

"awareness" for vitakka is just wrong.  

Again you have the same logical absurdities transitioning from first to second jhana. How could you abandon the activity of 'awareness' when you leave 1st jhana and enter second jhana? That's a pretty basic mental function.  I'm glad you agree that 'jue' has discursive thinking and logical reasoning involved as its primary meaning in Chinese - that's useful data, as I dont' have extensive experience with ancient chinese. "Awareness" for vitakka on the other hand, is just wrong. 

His addition of the bracketed "[directed]" is an attempt to match the late Theravada wrong translation of "initial application" as vitakka. Basically trying to ride the coat tails of one commonly accepted (but very wrong) translation. 

But the agama schools have nothing to do with Theravada, they're a completely different lineage. And  according to Agama experts, there is no evidence of any sutras supporting the idea of "initial application" or "directed awareness." 

Dr. William Chu, one of the translators who worked on that BDK translation project, says this about  V&V: 

(A note on vitakka and vicāra)
Ven. Anālayo translated jue and guan as “directed awareness and sustained contemplation,” but that’s a translation based on an extrapolation of the literal reading of some archaic characters (in non-Buddhist Chinese contexts, they mean “realize” and “observe,” respectively). The Mahaprajnaparamita-sastra and the Yogacarabhumi (texts that are traditionally used as dictionaries), among others, explain that jue and guan should be understood as “coarse thinking” and “subtle thinking,” respectively.

The Theravada idea that vitakka = 'initial application' is popular and commonly accepted as the correct othorthodox view on the subject, but it's wrong, which I show in detail here.

• 🔗Audit: U Thittila mistranslation of V&V in Abhidhamma Vb first jhāna gloss 

🔗Even in redefinition, vitakka is thinking (featuring simile of doorstop)


In short, canonical Abhidhamma vibhanga agrees with EBT (early buddhist text) that vitakka and vicara of first jhana has 3 types of kusala thought that are expressions of vaci-sankhara, mental talk, things you think before you say them out out. 

It's late Abhidhamma and Vism. that redefines jhana and vitakka, and ONLY for while one is in their redefined jhana. Otherwise, vitakka means the same thing, discursive thinking, even in Abhidhamma scripture. "Initial & sustained application" is a deliberate mistranslation to groom people to accept their redefinition of jhana. It's not just a wrong translation, it's criminal, as my detailed audit shows in the two linked articles above. 


Comments

  1. Many people who buy into this interpretation that vitakka is "directed application of attention" come from a certain assumption--the assumption that jhanas are about opening up to a pre-verbal/non-conceptual present moment. Therefore these people cannot conceive that one can "meditate with thought."

    But jhanas in early Buddhist texts are teleological--they are guided and framed by Buddhist values and goals, and are not non-judgmental acceptance of whatever there is. These Buddhist values and goals (e.g. dispassion) are first internalized (hence "sutava/well-learned"), internally recited (hence vitakka/directed thinking), internally reviewed (hence vicara/evaluative thinking), and then steadily implemented (hence mindfulness) so that mental defilements are de-conditioned from the mind. All these Buddhist ideas--well-learnedness, mindfulness, vitakka, vicara, etc.--serve a consistent and concerted purpose.

    Yes, the de-conditioning process may eventually take on a non-thinking turn (second jhana and above), but that is, only after the verbal instructions are already so internalized and familiar to the meditator, that Buddhist values and goals are guiding him in a non-verbal, intuitive way (hence, first jhana CAN be a basis for full liberation, but higher jhanas serve as even more effective tools).

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