(of a supposed expert on Jhāna and/or Pāḷi) explain ('splain) how Jhāna works according to the suttas,
to someone (who oftentimes knows more about Jhāna, suttas, Vism., than the 'expert'),
in a condescending manner, with a baffling combination of overconfidence and cluelessness.
1. "Sujato brahm'splained that the Buddha teased out a special esoteric meaning out of that word 'vitakka' because he [the Buddha!] had an impoverished vocabulary and was forced to redefine it."
2. "I asked a Pa Auk teacher what is ekaggata,
what does it mean in first jhāna,
and why does it redundantly have the same role as both vitakka and vicāra (gluing mind to nimitta),
and how the heck does second jhāna even work if vitakka and vicāra drop out,
yet ekaggata supposedly had the same role?
They brahmsplained some mumbo jumbo.
I can't even remember the confusing nonsensical string of words they said."
3. Ajahn Brahm claims 'kāmehi' of first jhāna is not sensual pleasures, but the 5 sensory faculties themselves. When asked to show what suttas show that ever being the case, since every occurrence in the suttas is always about sensual pleasures, he refers to the first jhāna formula use of 'kāmehi'. This kind of brahmsplanation is circular reasoning, a fallacy so elementary even a young middle school student could spot it.
4. Followers of both Brahm and Vism. based heretical redefinitions of jhāna
brahmsplain that even though the five factors of first jhāna are present and in full force,
it's not actually first jhāna "proper".
(Vimuttimagga, canoncial Abhidhamma, and EBT suttas disagree, if jhāna factors are there, even for the time it takes to snap one's fingers, that's a moment of jhāna.
Vism. also corrupts the original definition of access (upacara) and fixed (appana) samādhi from Vimuttimagga.)
Kind of like saying even though the sperm is there,
egg is there,
the egg is fertilized,
it's not pregnancy "proper",
it's just that the factors of pregnancy are there.
Other examples
Sujato, Brahm, Vism., etc., redefining jhāna's
kāya as "body of mind",
vitakka as "not thinking",
rūpa as "not physical form, mental visual form",
is about as convincing as Ian (manager of Rock group 'Spinal Tap')
'splaining that "appeal is becoming more selective."
Not that hard to prove [Analayo's interpretation of jhāna is wrong]. Look at the time line from EBT, to KN Pe interpretation of jhāna which is embodied, non-frozen, straightforward verbal thought vitakka. Pe is the earliest jhāna commentary. Then look at vimutti magga, also an embodied jhāna, and seems to take vitakka explanation straight from Pe.
So for 500 years after Buddha died, jhāna is interpreted with an honest dictionary, straightforward embodied jhāna with lucid discerning, clear comphrension and vipassana capability in all four jhānas, and vitakka as verbal thought.
Then in Vism., which is based on Vimt. but uses a later more corrupted form of Abhidhamma, jhāna becomes a disembodied frozen stupor where vitakka gets redefined into something completely unheard of. And it's only in the redefinition of first jhāna, that vitakka gets redefined into "not verbal thought". And that comes from Abhidhamma commentary, not canonical Ab. Elsewhere in Vism., vitakka in a samādhi context is still verbal regular thought. For example, one mentally recites "earth kasina, earth kasina", as a preliminary exercise to enter formless attianments.
So Analayo in his intro you quote below is fraudulent, completely ignorant, or just outright lying. I choose to believe he's competent and biased, and didn't do his homework properly and thoroughly (ignoring Pe, Vimt, Vism differences) so that supports fraudulent intent. At best, you could give him the benefit of the doubt and say he's well intentioned but incompetent.
in order to understand better Anālayo's background thought and intentions, I think, this needs to be borne in mind:
Introduction In a monograph published posthumously, Cousins (2022: 34f) offers the following assessment:
It is probably fair to say that the majority opinion these days … is one that rejects the traditional Theravāda Buddhist understanding of jhāna. For these scholars jhāna, or at least the first jhāna, is a type of thinking that is characterized by the presence of joy and happiness and is free from the hindrances, but is not otherwise radically different from ordinary consciousness … Perhaps they conceive it as rather like the state of mind when a scholar intensively explores some abstract question.
As he notes, this majority opinion does not square particularly well with the actual textual evidence. In addition, it implicitly “claims that the whole later Indian Buddhist tradition has misunderstood the basics of its own meditation tradition” (p. 35), which he understandably considers a problematic assumption.
Certainly, there are transmission errors in Agama and Theravada suttas. MA 102's omission of first jhāna from standard four jhāna formula, is highly unlikely to be a transmission error. And even if it was, and we insert first jhāna back into the formula, it doesn't negatively impact the correct jhāna interpretation.
All it does is give a little bit of wiggle room to make Analayo's corrupt jhana interpretation SEEM more plausible [to those biased audience members desperate to interpret jhāna as a disembodied frozen stupor]. At best, you would hope some other sutta explains that vitakka changes meaning, Because MA 102 certainly doesn't give any indication of that (by reinserting first jhāna formula).
On the Theravada side, MN 125's omission of first jhāna is even more clear it's not a transmission error. Because they include a second satipatthana section with a purified vitakka, following the previous satipatthana section with impure vitakka. So that second satipatthana IS FIRST jhāna.
That Analayo thinks Theravada had "transmission error" with MN 125, and that Agama school had "transmission error" with MA 102,
is remarkably arrogant.
Somehow, the teams of oral reciters charged with maintaining the integrity and fidelity of MN 125, accidentally omitted first jhāna, spontaneously created a second satipatthana section,
and it took the brilliance of scholar monk Analayo to uncover this error 2500 years later?
And I think you are wrong. And Yin Shun's and Choong's theories are wrong as well (see Travagnin/Anālayo 2020).
You think I'm wrong even though you didn't read the very short article I linked for you? https://www.dhammawheel.com/viewtopic.p ... 21#p770821 MA 102 alone, and Analayo's intellectual dishonesty and fraudulent interpretation of vitakka in that is abundantly clear? Why do you think it's wrong? What evidence do you have?
I have read a great deal of your "audit", and I will finish it soon.
I have just now read this short blog-entry.
It seems that the thrust of your argument is here:
But in MA 102, by eliminating the first jhana formula and jumping directly to second jhana, they are unequivocally stating that the kusala Dhamma vitakkas jue and guan are exactly the same as 'nian' 念 , when they are kusala/skillful and in line with Dharma.
What immediately springs to my mind: 1) If I am not mistaken, Anālayo writes about such contractions of jhāna formulas -- they might be mistakes (I need to recheck that) 2) If it is the only such instance, which seems to be the case, we can take it as a mistake of transmission or a scriber.
In Anālayo's majestic book Early Buddhist Oral Tradition: Textual Formation and Transmission (2022) he collects a great deal of various mistakes and errors in transmission.
Where I think you are 100% wrong is your qualification of Anālayo's actions as "dishonest" and "fraudulent". Because , I think, you haven't demonstratedthat. To prove that there must be a whole "criminal court"-like procedure, which scrutinizes in detail Anālayo's intentions , views and details of the actions at all times.
In short, you don't know what Anālayo has and had on his mind. It only seems to you, you only suspect that, but there is a long way from this to the actual proof of these stark allegations. I think you have failed to convincingly substantiate and demonstrate any "dishonesty", "fraud", etc.
I will continue to comment and scrutinize your claims in this thread later.
Responding to @auto from a second thread he hijacked, with his misunderstanding of vitakka:
You're having trouble distinguishing between verbal thought (vitakka), speech (vāca), and sub-verbal mental activity (which cognizes, understands, does vipassana). Unfortunately, this misunderstanding is common, even from famous bhikkhu scholars.
For example, you can mentally say the words "may I be happy" in your mind without vocalizing. That's vitakka (verbal thought). You can do that in first jhāna (a correct EBT first jhāna). If you let the verbal portion [linguistic labels, words] drop away, and just the mental intention remains of "may I be happy", those are perceptions, citta sankhāra, mental fabrications. Now you're in second jhāna, and can do metta in all four jhānas.
If, while in second jhāna, you have a separate vitakka thought with mental words, "may my friends also be happy", then you've dropped out of second jhāna back into first jhāna with the extra mental burden of forming verbal labels for those unvocalized words. If you vocalize the words (vāca), "may I be happy", you've dropped out of first jhāna as well. This is what is meant by SN 36.11 "speech ceases in first jhāna". The energetic dispersion to expel air from your lungs by saying words out loud, disrupts the jhānic force that circulates your energy channels at higher frequency (compared to non-jhānic mind).
It's all very simple, straightforward, honest use of standard vocabulary of critical terms involving the oral tradition. vitakka are verbal thoughts in the form of a communicable language with linguistic labels for those words. vāca (same as latin vox, english 'vocal'), means you have to vibrate those vocal cords, flap your lips and expel air from your lungs for those vitakka mental words to become "vocalized speech."
In Analayo, Brahm, Sujato's corrupted re-definition of jhāna, vāca, vitakka, becomes all muddled and conflated. In their "jhāna", there is no meaningful distinction between vitakka and vāca, and you can't even do metta in their four jhānas! Let alone distinguish between what metta looks like in first jhāna compared to second jhāna.
In Sujato's world, vacī-sankhāra (equated by the Buddha with vitakka) would have no meaning. A clinically insane person mumbling incoherently, a tractor crushing rocks and earth making loud noise, is all vacī-sankhāra.
In Sujato's world, the vinaya (monastic rules) would have no meaning, would be unenforceable because there's no clear distinction between verbal karma with vāca (you say words out loud) and mental karma (you think but don't say vitakka out loud).
But that's what happens when you allow famous popular influencer Bhikkhus to be the official trend setters and rule makers, based on their charisma and popularity, and enabling monastic community that supports corrupted interpretations and suppresses and censors criticism of wrong views.
You get incoherent, corrupt jhāna and Dhamma.
You can stand by and just go along with this, or you can do something about it, if you care about preserving genuine Dhamma.
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