DN 21 vitakka is first and second jhana context, and definitely means thinking, not Vism. "initial application"
The commentary to DN 21 clarifies that the vitakka is definitely 'thinking', like in Vinicchaya (PED defn. below).
A friend forwarded this article from Buddhadust.net:
http://buddhadust.net/backmatt
has this as one of Sakka's questions:
"What being present,
is desire present,
and what being absent,
is desire also absent?"
"Mental pre-occupation, ruler of gods, —
this is the source,
this is the cause of desire,
this is what gives birth to desire,
this is how desire comes to be.
Wherewith our mind is pre-occupied,
for that desire arises;
if our mind is not so pre-occupied,
desire is absent."
++++++++++++++++++
Mental pre-occupation = vitakka
On which Rhys Davids footnotes:
Vitakka. The Cy. does not give the Abhidhamma definition of this term
(see Dh.S., § 7; 'Bud. Psy.' p. 10 [attached]: 'the disposing, fixating,
focusing, applying the mind.' Cf. also 'Compendium of Buddhist
Philosophy' Appendix: vitakka, P.T.S., 1910), but gives as a parallel
term vinicchaya (see above, p. 55
[http://buddhadust.net/dhamma-
'lābhaɱ paṭicca vinicchayo'— 'deciding respecting gain'). The word is
used, according to Suttanta method, not with any fine shade of
psychological meaning, but in its popular sense of μεριμνάω, 'taking
thought for' (Matt. vi. 25), 'being pre-occupied about.'
Vinicchaya [vi+nicchaya; cp. Vedic vinishcaya] 1. discrimination,
distinction, thought, (firm) opinion; thorough knowledge of (*-) A
III.354 (pāpakamma-); Sn 327 (dhamma-), 838 ( = dvāsaṭṭhi
diṭṭhi-vinicchayā Nd1 186), 867 (-ɱ kūrute; cp. Nd1 265); J III.205
(attha-); PvA 1, 112, 210 (kūṭa-), 287. - 2. decision; (as technical
term in law:) investigation, trial, judgment (given by the king or his
minister) D II.58 (with reference to lābha, explained as deciding what
to do with one's gains) = III.289 = A IV.400 = Vbh 390 (explained at
VbhA 512, where vinicchaya is said to be fourfold, viz. ñāṇa-, taṇhā-,
diṭṭhi-, vitakka-); J II.2. - 3. court house, hall of judgment J I.176;
III.105; IV.122, 370; VI.333; Miln 332 (vinaya-, i.e. having the Vinaya
as the law court in the City of Righteousness). - 4. (as technical term
in logic and psychology:) (process of) judgment, detailed analysis,
deliberation, consideration, ascertainment J V.60 (-ɱ vicāreti); VbhA 46
sq. (according to attha, lakkhaṇa, etc.), 83 sq. (id.); KhA 23, 75.
Matt. 6.25: "Therefore I say unto you, Take no thought for your life,
what ye shall eat, or what ye shall drink; nor yet for your body, what
ye shall put on. Is not the life more than meat, and the body than raiment?"
Sorry, I do not have a copy of Compenduium of Buddhist Philosophy. Which
looks like it might be interesting here.
If it were claimed that this referenced only pre-first jhana, it would
still be a strong argument in favor of the necessity for the Buddha to
explain that once this vitakka was overcome upon entering the first
jhana, then the second vitakka (to be understood this second way) needs
to be cultivated and then, within the same jhana (the first), abandoned
to attain the second jhana. Absurd! Why not just go straight to the
second jhana from the ordinary mental state with it's ordinary thinking?
Which is actually what was being described in DN 18.
But in fact this argument should not be made as the Buddha's statement
would apply to whatever meaning one gave to vitakka; pre-jhana or in
jhana, vitakka is the source of desire. I do not think one will find
anywhere in the suttas any suggestion that the bhikkhu should do
anything which actually cultivated desire!
And in this place (at this point in this sutta) would be the ideal point
to teach this difference if there were such as Sakka states he is
destined to enter the Brahma lokas in the future and such entry requires
the first jhana.
http://buddhadust.net
A friend forwarded this article from Buddhadust.net:
http://buddhadust.net/backmatt
has this as one of Sakka's questions:
"What being present,
is desire present,
and what being absent,
is desire also absent?"
"Mental pre-occupation, ruler of gods, —
this is the source,
this is the cause of desire,
this is what gives birth to desire,
this is how desire comes to be.
Wherewith our mind is pre-occupied,
for that desire arises;
if our mind is not so pre-occupied,
desire is absent."
++++++++++++++++++
Mental pre-occupation = vitakka
On which Rhys Davids footnotes:
Vitakka. The Cy. does not give the Abhidhamma definition of this term
(see Dh.S., § 7; 'Bud. Psy.' p. 10 [attached]: 'the disposing, fixating,
focusing, applying the mind.' Cf. also 'Compendium of Buddhist
Philosophy' Appendix: vitakka, P.T.S., 1910), but gives as a parallel
term vinicchaya (see above, p. 55
[http://buddhadust.net/dhamma-
'lābhaɱ paṭicca vinicchayo'— 'deciding respecting gain'). The word is
used, according to Suttanta method, not with any fine shade of
psychological meaning, but in its popular sense of μεριμνάω, 'taking
thought for' (Matt. vi. 25), 'being pre-occupied about.'
PED: Vinicchaya
Vinicchaya [vi+nicchaya; cp. Vedic vinishcaya] 1. discrimination,
distinction, thought, (firm) opinion; thorough knowledge of (*-) A
III.354 (pāpakamma-); Sn 327 (dhamma-), 838 ( = dvāsaṭṭhi
diṭṭhi-vinicchayā Nd1 186), 867 (-ɱ kūrute; cp. Nd1 265); J III.205
(attha-); PvA 1, 112, 210 (kūṭa-), 287. - 2. decision; (as technical
term in law:) investigation, trial, judgment (given by the king or his
minister) D II.58 (with reference to lābha, explained as deciding what
to do with one's gains) = III.289 = A IV.400 = Vbh 390 (explained at
VbhA 512, where vinicchaya is said to be fourfold, viz. ñāṇa-, taṇhā-,
diṭṭhi-, vitakka-); J II.2. - 3. court house, hall of judgment J I.176;
III.105; IV.122, 370; VI.333; Miln 332 (vinaya-, i.e. having the Vinaya
as the law court in the City of Righteousness). - 4. (as technical term
in logic and psychology:) (process of) judgment, detailed analysis,
deliberation, consideration, ascertainment J V.60 (-ɱ vicāreti); VbhA 46
sq. (according to attha, lakkhaṇa, etc.), 83 sq. (id.); KhA 23, 75.
Matt. 6.25: "Therefore I say unto you, Take no thought for your life,
what ye shall eat, or what ye shall drink; nor yet for your body, what
ye shall put on. Is not the life more than meat, and the body than raiment?"
Sorry, I do not have a copy of Compenduium of Buddhist Philosophy. Which
looks like it might be interesting here.
If it were claimed that this referenced only pre-first jhana, it would
still be a strong argument in favor of the necessity for the Buddha to
explain that once this vitakka was overcome upon entering the first
jhana, then the second vitakka (to be understood this second way) needs
to be cultivated and then, within the same jhana (the first), abandoned
to attain the second jhana. Absurd! Why not just go straight to the
second jhana from the ordinary mental state with it's ordinary thinking?
Which is actually what was being described in DN 18.
But in fact this argument should not be made as the Buddha's statement
would apply to whatever meaning one gave to vitakka; pre-jhana or in
jhana, vitakka is the source of desire. I do not think one will find
anywhere in the suttas any suggestion that the bhikkhu should do
anything which actually cultivated desire!
And in this place (at this point in this sutta) would be the ideal point
to teach this difference if there were such as Sakka states he is
destined to enter the Brahma lokas in the future and such entry requires
the first jhana.
http://buddhadust.net
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